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Electric

utilities,

and
new
of

reactor designers

badly underestimated the costs

and the federal government have
power plants over the past fifteen

builders,

nuclear

Although not all of the increases were readily predictable, particularly
those caused by rapid general inflation, nuclear advocates failed to foresee most
of the sixfold growth in real costs resulting from new reactors' greater complex-

years.

ity,

scope,

and regulatory

surveillance.

power proponents to connew nuclear plants would be

This review recounts the methods used by nuclear
vince policymakers, the public,

and themselves

that

competitive with other energy sources, long after conclusive contrary evidence

shows that the technique of "engineering estimation" relied
upon by government and industry officials was singularly unsuited to predicting
costs for an immature technology subject to changing regulation and overseen by
mediocre management.
was

available. It

Industry conventions against expressing costs in real terms (constant dollars)

further disguised the extent of cost escalation and impeded the application of empirical data in predicting future costs. Rigorous statistical examinations showing
reactor cost growth far outstripping both overall inflation

and

coal-fired elec-

were performed by outside analysts only. Failure to heed such findings has contributed to billions of dollars of excess investment in new nuclear
tricity costs

by fifteen New England utilities.
The article concludes with suggestions for improving future estimation of
nuclear power costs, and an appeal for institutionalizing countervailing economic

projects, like Seabrook, being built

assessments of large capital investment projects.

economic fortunes of nuclear power
the United States have
The
worsened over the past
marginal
going from promising

steadily

in

fifteen years,

calamitous.

odd

Among

the

to

new generation of U.S. nuclear power

reactors finished, cancelled, or

still

plants

to

— the
— no more
fifty-

under construction after 1982

produce economical electricity. The aggregate monetary damage from the remaining plants may reach $100 billion, and utility investors,
than a handful

will

1

customers, and regulators are already warring over
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How

could such massive waste occur, particularly in a country noted for efficient capital allocation? The answer to this question is complicated; no explanation

is

uncontroversial. But a careful look at the cost-estimation process of the

nuclear industry and the federal government in the 1970s and 1980s will

show

"systematic confusion of expectation with fact," as one observer has described
it,

and steadfast denial of adverse cost experience.

The Heart of

the Nuclear Cost Predicament:

Skyrocketing Capital Costs

Nuclear power's cost problem in the United States
crease in reactor "capital costs"

48

is

rooted in the astonishing

in-

— construction costs plus related financing costs.

Nuclear plants being finished today are costing fifteen to twenty times as

much

as

reactors built in the early seventies: $3 billion to build a typical thousand-mega-

watt reactor now, versus $150 to $200 million then. The real increase, with inflation factored out,

As nuclear

is

about sixfold.

began rising in the seventies, predicting them became
central to the debate over the economics of building new plants. In this debate,
the prime benchmark for nuclear costs was concurrent coal-fired electricity
pragmatic standard, yet a myopic one. On the one hand, coal-fired plants already
produced half of the nation's power, and limits to domestic oil and gas resources
made coal the only nonnuclear fuel suitable for new, conventional central-station
generating plants. Nuclear/coal comparisons were also simple and familiar to
utility planners. On the other hand, by insisting that large, central generators
were the only viable means of servicing electricity requirements, the power industry effectively ignored alternatives such as cogeneration, renewables, and improved energy efficiency. Today, after considerable advocacy and development of
new analytical tools by environmentalist organizations, the alternatives have moved
to center stage in informed electricity policy-making. 2 But insofar as the nuclear/
coal framework dominated the nuclear economics debate over the past decade
the focus of this paper
I adopt it here.
While the comparison of nuclear- and coal-generating costs hinges on capital costs, it musi; also subsume costs for maintenance, repairs, outages, decommissioning, and fuel, nuclear's strong suit. It is helpful to distill assumptions
about these costs into a "break-even" capital-cost ratio, denoting how large a
capital cost handicap nuclear plants can offset through fuel savings. Although
geographic differences in coal prices imply region-specific break-even ratios, a
"national average" break-even ratio is a useful construct. Depending on the
analyst's view of cost factors such as the nuclear plant's capacity factor and the
capital costs

—

—

coal plant's fuel cost, the break-even capital cost ratio has generally stood be-

tween

1.2

and

1.4,

meaning

that nuclear plants could stand a 20 to 40 percent

higher capital cost than coal plants and

still

end up equal

in lifetime

generating

costs.

The Empirical Evidence
In
I.

what became a widely quoted statement, Harvard Business School Professor
C.

Bupp wrote

in 1978,

"Systematic confusion of expectation with

fact,

of

hope with

reality,

has been the most characteristic feature of the entire 30-year

The distinction between empirically supported fact and expectation was blurred from the beginning in the discussion of
was independent analysis
[W]hat was missing
nuclear power economics.
effort to develop nuclear power.

.

of actual cost experience."

Bupp was

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

3

decrying the failure of nuclear promoters to reconcile their estimates

of future plant costs with empirical data, or even to distinguish between the two.
This failure persists even today. Only four comprehensive studies of U.S. nuclear

have been published. Three, produced independently of
found
that cost trends were running against nuclear power;
the nuclear industry,
the fourth, sponsored by nuclear utilities, seemed constructed deliberately to
thwart the drawing of any conclusions at all.
The three independent studies measured nuclear and coal capital cost trends
from the costs of completed plants. Bupp's Harvard-M.I.T. team found in
1974-75 that nuclear capital costs had increased two to three times faster than
coal plant capital costs between the late 1960s and mid-1970s. 4 William Mooz of
the Rand Corporation demonstrated that the sharp increases in real reactor costs
5
in the first half of the 1970s continued with no letup in the second half. My
work between 1979 and 1981 showed that the average ratio between nuclear and
coal capital costs increased from just over 1.0 at the start of the 1970s to over 1.5
at the end of that decade, even counting expensive pollution control devices such
capital cost experience

as sulfur dioxide scrubbers in the later coal plant costs.

I

also identified divergent

nuclear and coal regulatory trends portending that the capital cost ratio would

much

climb

late 1980s.

higher, to a range of 1.75 to 2.65 for plants finished in the mid- to

6

Empirical data are validating this forecast. The nuclear/coal capital cost ratio
for plants built in the 1980s

to

1

.4

break-even range

averaging between 2.0 and 2.5, far beyond the 1.2

is

— the capital cost ratio at which nuclear and coal generat-

ing costs are equal. 7

Nuclear power interests haven't so

much

rebutted these empirical analyses as

ignored them, partly by sending up a smoke screen of studies favorable to nuclear

power. These studies have been largely of two types: compilations of cur-

and nuclear generating costs, with the sample of plants selected to put
the best possible face on nuclear power; and "engineering estimates' that disregarded mounting regulatory and construction problems in forecasting reactor
costs. The most influential of these studies are discussed below.
rent coal

'

Put Your Best Foot Forward: The Atomic
Industrial

Forum Surveys

The annual surveys of

the U.S. nuclear trade group, the

(AIF), purport to measure the current cost of electricity
plants. Until recently, they obligingly

cheapest. For example, the
cost

— fuel, operations,

and

AIF

Atomic Industrial Forum
from nuclear, coal, and oil

found nuclear-generated

electricity to

be

survey of 1978 costs put the average generating

capital charges

and

— at

1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour

2.3 cents/ kwh for coal plants.

8

(kwh)

These figures,
and similar ones for other years, were disseminated by the AIF, the Edison Electric
Institute, and many utilities, and were widely reported by the press.
for the nation's nuclear plants
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objections were raised to these surveys. First, they obscured emerging

by lumping together economical early reactors with uneconomical
later ones. Worse, although the surveys professed to be comprehensive, the
samples were badly skewed to favor nuclear power. Twelve of the fourteen most
expensive U.S. nuclear plants were omitted from the 1977 and 1978 surveys, as
publicity-shy owners of expensive reactors withheld data. In addition, owing to a
survey convention that limited the comparison to utilities with nuclear plants, only
a small fraction of U.S. coal plants were included, and these tended to be above
average in cost (since utilities build fewer reactors where coal is cheaper).
After considerable criticism, 9 the AIF broadened its nuclear samples (but not
coal). However, in order to elicit cost data for expensive reactors, the surveys
stopped grouping costs by utility. This precludes checking individual plant data
an important limitation in light of arithmetic inconsistencies in some AIF surveys
and the inherent complexity of much of the cost data. Indeed, the current surveys
are mere one-page press handouts, yet the AIF and other nuclear promoters
represent them as in-depth evaluations of comparative costs.
cost trends

50

Don't Look Back: The Department of Energy Estimates

For

all their

biases, the

AIF

surveys have not been nuclear promoters' most in-

sidious misrepresentations of reactor costs. That distinction falls to a fifteen-year
series

of reports prepared for the Atomic Energy Commission (and

its

successor, the

Department of Energy [DOE] ) by Philadelphia-based United Engineers & Constructors (UE&C). 10 These reports have formed the basis of the federal government's pronouncements on the economics of nuclear power since 1968, and they
have had a profound influence on U.S. energy policy and utility investments.
The DOE reports rely on a procedure known as engineering estimation to
predict future nuclear and coal plant costs. This technique first develops a conceptual plant design based on a scope of work that is predicated on an assumed
set of safety and environmental requirements. It then calculates the labor,
materials, and equipment needed to fulfill the design and applies estimates of
wage rates and material costs to compute the total charges. Contingency allowances, typically 10 to 15 percent, are added to cover new safety criteria, strikes,
delivery delays, or other problems likely to crop up in big construction projects.
Engineering estimation has failed spectacularly at nuclear plants, however.
Since the early 1970s, the inflation-adjusted capital costs of

new

plants have risen

an average of 14 percent each year, consuming annually contingency allowances
intended to cover a project's whole construction lifetime. The root cause has
been new and more stringently applied safety requirements that have expanded
the scope of projects during construction, together with failure to manage construction to

Yet

accommodate

DOE's

the increased stringency.

hindsight has been no better than

never retrospectively compared

its

its

foresight.

nuclear cost forecasts to actual reactor costs,

or otherwise acknowledged the persistent gap between
Instead,

DOE

The department has

its

estimates and reality.

analysts endlessly fine-tuned their elaborate computer

model

—

that

varied capital costs according to almost every conceivable assumption geographexcept for the conical location, cooling tower type, turbine configuration, etc.
ditions that were driving reactor costs sky-high: unstable regulatory requirements,

—

changing designs, and outmatched construction management, conditions well
documented elsewhere by DOE's own cost contractor, among others. 11 Using this
model, for example, DOE estimated in 1977 that reactors completed in 1986
would cost a mere $1.1 billion per thousand megawatts of capacity half of what

—

1985-87 plants are actually costing, after netting out differences between expected

and actual

interest

DOE

The

and

inflation rates.

reports also overstated coal capital costs, contributing further to in-

accurate perception of nuclear power's competitiveness. For most of the 1970s,

DOE

and other nuclear proponents assumed that costs of S0 2 scrubbers and
other pollution controls needed at new coal plants would match growing nuclear
safety requirements, keeping future coal plant costs close to those of

new

reactors. In

fact, nuclear safety rules proved far costlier than coal emission controls, and the
average ratio of completed nuclear to coal capital costs grew from 1.05 in 1971
to 1.5 in 1978, even with scrubbers.
DOE's most egregious misestimate of relative nuclear/coal capital costs came
in 1980, when it doubled its 1978 nuclear and coal cost forecasts. This was appropriate for nuclear plants, which faced regulatory impacts from the 1979 Three
Mile Island (TMI) accident, along with record inflation and interest rates. Yet

no new regulatory constraints that weren't already reflected in
DOE's 1978 forecasts. Although empirical evidence indicated otherwise, nuclear
promoters continued to insist that coal's regulatory burden and capital cost
coal plants faced

escalation were as severe as nuclear power's.

The 1980

an implied future ratio of nuclear to coal capital costs
no greater than the 1.5 to 1 ratio for plants completed in 1978, was especially
fateful. Utilities and DOE used it to reassure wavering utility regulators and investors that besieged reactor construction ventures were still worth completing.
These reassurances have since proven hollow for investors whose capital is at risk
in several dozen expensive reactor projects, and for regulators who are now walking the edge between utility insolvency and sharp rate increases.
DOE's 1982 estimates implied a nuclear/coal capital cost ratio of 1.6 to 1.7, which
also lagged far behind changing costs. Yet these estimates remain the basis of DOE's
conclusion that nuclear plants ordered in the 1980s and finished in the 1990s will be
report, with

competitive with coal. 12 In fact, reactors being finished in the 1980s are averaging at
least twice the capital costs

and 80 percent higher
clusion

is

of

new

coal plants

and

lifetime generating costs.

13

will

probably average between 70

Nevertheless,

DOE's

optimistic con-

widely cited, particularly in international evaluations of nuclear power, as

an authoritative portrait of relative nuclear/coal costs in the United States. 14
DOE's estimator United Engineers, for its part, has begun a decade late to
back away from its insistence that nuclear power's precipitous capital cost escala-

—

tion

is

no

different

from that

for coal.

—

"Recent information on material and

UE&C's chief cost estimator in 1982, "indicate[s]
increase may be appropriate for nuclear plants." 15

labor requirements," admitted
that a

.

.

.

higher rate of cost

Confusing Time with Costs

Throughout the late seventies and early eighties, while rising costs and the TMI
accident were prompting outsiders to look critically at reactor economics, the
power industry continued to rehash its engineering estimates of capital costs. These
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from nuclear power's deep-seated regulatory and construcand oblivious of the widening nuclear/coal gulf. World-leading reac-

estimates were divorced
tion problems

tor constructor Bechtel projected a 1.21 nuclear/coal capital cost ratio just before

TMI,

The Committee on Nuclear and

increasing only to 1.25 afterward. 16

native Energy Systems of the National

Academy

Alter-

of Science, a senior nuclear-

industry panel cast as impartial "scientists," predicted a range of ratios between
1.0

and

1.25.

17

As

recently as 1982, the year the Wall Street Journal coined the ex-

pression "rate shock" to describe the cost impacts of

engineer Sargent

& Lundy was

still

new nuclear

plants, architect-

forecasting a capital cost ratio under 1.5. 18

Many

of these sources seized on shortening reactor construction periods as the
means to control costs. Studies by Sargent & Lundy in particular featured painstaking calculations of the potential savings from compressing licensing and con-

52

most of these savings are illusory, for they are won by
making ratepayers pay for the power plant sooner. The use value of money forfeited by ratepayers offsets the savings from curbing compounding interest during
construction, as simple arithmetic demonstrates. At 10 percent interest rates, for
example, ratepayers are no better off with a $3.0 billion reactor finished (and
entering rates) today than with a $3.3 billion plant finished a year from now. 20
Yet in power industry parlance, the earlier plant is 10 percent cheaper.
The utility industry's Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has also been
sidetracked into the construction duration issue. It published a major empirical
study of power plant "lead times" in 1983 but has shied away from analyzing
struction times. 19 Yet

empirical plant costs.

Its

assertion that "time-related costs represent a large frac-

most large projects" 21 also shows a failure to apare primarily interest and inflation, which evapo-

tion of the total capital costs of
preciate that time-related costs
rate

when

the time value of

with industry

dogma

money

is

considered. (The

EPRI

to conclude that coal-plant licensing

study did break

and construction

periods were shorter and more predictable than for nuclear plants, however.) In
the

same

for

its

spirit,

the nuclear industry has

completion in 1983 in a

little

all

over

but canonized the

six years,

ignoring a

St.

Lucie 2 reactor

number of

its

slower-built contemporaries with lower real costs. River Bend, also considered

successful for

its

below-average construction time, actually has the industry's

fourth largest per kilowatt (kw) real cost.

Lonely at the Top: Commonwealth Edison's Nuclear Program

Chicago-based Commonwealth Edison, the nation's largest reactor operator and
builder, is also the industry's most vocal champion of nuclear power. A 1978

Edison article in Science touting the roughly 40 percent savings over coal for the
company's six large nuclear units helped shore up support for nuclear power in
the academic and scientific communities. 22 However, the comparison was biased
by Edison's excess capacity, which leads it to operate its coal units part-time,
thereby inflating their per-unit fixed costs. The remaining savings were also
peculiar to Edison, insofar as

its

nuclear units cost only half as

much

as the U.S.

average (four were built as loss-leaders by General Electric), while the company's
coal fuel costs were well above those for most other

utilities. 23

The

article's cost

predictions for Edison's 1980s nuclear units were also strikingly inaccurate,

underpredicting their real costs by at least a third. 24

The Chameleonlike Dr.
The power

Perl

and coal capital costs to
date have been those by Lewis Perl of National Economic Research Associates
(NERA), a leading utility consulting firm. Like Bupp, Mooz, and myself, Perl
found in statistical terms that real nuclear capital costs increased rapidly during
the seventies. However, Perl rejected extrapolating further increases into the
eighties, arguing that the upward slope in historic costs could be read statistically
as the temporary growth phase of a cyclical process. 25 Instead, Perl put forth a
4

industry's only empirical analyses of nuclear

'fall-back" view in 1978 that future nuclear plants (and coal plants as well)

would have the same

real costs as recently

completed plants, implying only a 1.44

nucrear/coal capital cost ratio.

What

may

Perl represented as reasoned conservatism

to bolster

NERA's many

utility clients,

have been

in fact

artifice

whose nuclear construction programs he

has defended before numerous state regulatory commissions, both prospectively,

programs soured, in the 1980s. For
Perl calculated his capital cost trends from a hybrid data base that blended actual
costs of plants completed through 1977 with utility estimates for plants under
construction through 1985. It was classic circular reasoning: by introducing utility
underestimates of future nuclear costs, Perl diluted the upward trend in completed reactor costs to permit the inference that nuclear cost growth might stop.
Perl couldn't avoid predicting further nuclear cost escalation in the one instance
in which he drew trends from completed plant costs only, in a talk to energy econoin the 1970s,

and retrospectively

mists in early 1978. There,

all

after the

of his

statistical

formulations of historical reactor

upward, and much more steeply than the corresponding
coal plant curves, as shown in figure 1. This formulation could not have been
salutary to NERA's utility clients, and it was subsequently withdrawn.
costs pointed unmistakably

Figure

1

Nuclear Construction Costs as Estimated by Three Regression
Forms Which Vary with Respect to the Treatment of Time (Dr. Perl)
Formulation

Formulation

I

Based on a Sample of Units On-Line by 1977

Based on

a

Sample

II

of Units On-Line or Projected

On-Line by 1985
Dollars

per

Dollars

kw

per

kw

1800-,

Logarithmic

1

1965

1970 1975

1980 1985 1990
Year of Estimate

995 2000 2005

1

1

1

T

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year of Estimate
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The two graphs show Dr.

1985

Perl's formulations of projected nuclear capital costs

as presented in a talk to the Eastern Economics Association in April 1978. Formulation I was based on actual costs of plants finished by 1977. The sample for
Formulation II included costs for this first group of plants plus utility estimates

of costs for plants under construction. In both formulations, Perl projected
future reactor costs with three different mathematical forms, as shown.

only empirical data were used, in Formulation

54

I, all

Where

three curves point sharply

upward, indicating continuing cost increases. In Formulation II, however, all
three cost curves, especially the parabolic, were ''pulled down" by the utility estimates, enabling Perl to argue that the direction of future nuclear costs was indeterminate. Projecting future data from estimates about the future is clearly
untenable, yet Perl has used Formulation II exclusively since late 1978. He has
never published the April 1978 paper from which these two figures were drawn.

The New England Experience

New England

has been no exception to the nationwide failure to anticipate un-

controlled growth in reactor costs. All six

New England

states face considerable

26

from utility overinvestment in nuclear power. In mid- 1985, the Millstone
3 and Seabrook 1 nuclear power units were estimated to cost $4 billion and $4.5
billion, respectively. That is twice the maximum cost at which the reactors could
compete with coal, and still further beyond the cost to break even with cheaper
alternatives such as Canadian hydroelectricity, cogeneration, or conservation. 27
Another $1 billion has been expended on Seabrook 2, effectively abandoned in
1984. Full recovery of these costs in rates would cause average electric rates to
double for some of the participants and to rise at least 15 percent across New
England as a whole. 28
The misestimation of costs has been more severe at Seabrook, which was begun several years later than Millstone and until recently lagged behind it considerably in sunk costs, making cancellation more feasible. Greater realism about
losses

Seabrook' s ultimate cost might have resulted in cancelling
at

it

in the early eighties,

a savings of several billion dollars. Yet, as late as 1982, an informed compari-

son of the Seabrook estimate to other plants indicated that the utilities were
underestimating Seabrook's cost by almost half. 29 This was not understood by
utility regulators

and investors

— or probably even by the

part because their comparisons were expressed in
that grossly overstated the effect of inflation

and

utilities

themselves

"nominal" or "mixed"

— in

dollars

interest costs for late plants

such as Seabrook. Thus, while the 40 percent increase in the Seabrook estimate in
late

1982

may have appeared

a sufficient correction,

it

largely reflected inflation

ten-month schedule delay and included only a fraction of the
real increase needed to match the costs of comparable nuclear facilities. The perception that the new estimate was in line with industry experience was a delusion.

and

interest for the

An Agenda

for Nuclear

Economics

Developing more rounds of nuclear capital cost estimates and comparisons would
seem pointless, at least until such time if that time should ever come that nuclear

—

power's institutional and technical status can be

—

clarified so that cost estimates

may

—

be grounded in

reality. Nevertheless,

clination to wait,

30

because nuclear power boosters show no

the following guidelines for future efforts in nuclear

in-

power

economics are offered.
First, nuclear and coal costs must be weighed not only against each other but
against the full spectrum of available electricity resources. This includes cogeneration, renewables, and improved energy efficiency. Orders for cogeneration and
renewable capacity have surpassed those for nuclear and coal since 1982, and gains
from improved efficiency, while harder to measure, have almost certainly been
greater. 31 With ''whole system costing" methodologies fully established to evaluate
these options, utilities can no longer limit their purview to nuclear and coal.
Second, capital cost data must be expressed in constant dollars, with financing
costs added separately. The nominal, "as-spent" dollars in which utilities report
nuclear and coal plant costs are a mishmash of interest charges, inflation effects,
and real costs having accounting but not economic meaning. 32 To distill cost trends
or draw meaningful comparisons from such data, analysts must first convert them
to constant terms, a task which at present often requires extraordinary effort.
Third, nuclear cost predictions should be benchmarked against empirical data
(in constant dollars). While each construction project may appear unique to its
builders, insightful statistical analysis of industrywide costs has proven successful
at extracting cost trends, which can serve as baselines for evaluating estimates of
future costs. This is true for coal as well as nuclear plants. Although coal plant
designs have remained far more stable, and their costs more amenable to engineering estimates (owing to lower susceptibility to regulatory changes during construction), estimates of future coal capital costs could be made more accurate by
reconciliation with empirical data.

Fourth, rising costs for reactor operations, maintenance, and improvements
must be reflected in forecasts of future nuclear "life-cycle" costs. O&M costs
and capital additions, as these items are known, have also been affected by increased reactor complexity and regulatory stringency, and have grown almost as
fast as reactor capital costs since the early seventies. They now average $75
million per year for each thousand megawatts of nuclear capacity, or 3 to 4 percent annually of original construction costs for

of

O&M

costs

and

new

plants. 33 Realistic assessments

capital additions are particularly important for weighing the

economics of completed or nearly completed reactors, for which most capital
costs have already been expended. Yet in shameless repetition of previous mistakes, most nuclear advocates dismiss past escalation in
costs and capital
additions as a product of "one-time events" and a bygone era of regulatory
change, and they project future costs at only half of present levels.
Fifth, differences between estimated future costs and recent cost experience
especially projections that future reactors will cost much less than those just
finished
must be fully justified. In particular, expectations that reduced
"regulatory turbulence" will cut reactor costs must be fleshed out with analyses
of the nature and cost of regulatory impacts. This will require separating the effects of more stringent regulatory criteria from the effects of changes in the
criteria
a distinction missing in most discussions to date.

O&M

—

—

The same applies to
ogies and standardized
and reductions

in

cost savings that nuclear advocates ascribe to
designs. Increased use of microprocessors

and

new

technol-

robotics,

custom engineering, could conceivably mitigate problems

in
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nuclear (and coal) design, construction, and operation in such areas as accident
analysis, regulatory evaluation, quality documentation,

on. But hand-waving

not an acceptable

is

win a hearing on

its

to estimate the savings, especially

of engineering misestimates. The nuclear industry
hopes for competitive future reactors only by acknowl-

given nuclear power's long
will

way

hazardous repair, and so

trail

edging the appalling level of current costs, and explaining
fer

from

its

why

its

future will dif-

past.

Lessons Learned

What

56

we

from the failure of nuclear promoters to represent
nuclear costs competently and candidly?
One lesson is that powerful institutions cannot be relied upon to act in their
own economic self-interest, let alone in the public interest. In the case considered
here nuclear cost escalation industry leaders and government planners failed to
fully grasp either causes or extent. They excessively blamed the general economic
conditions of high inflation and interest rates and overlooked the real increases
driven by nuclear-specific problems, namely the safety controversy and technical
deficiencies. Nuclear interests insisted that nuclear and coal cost behavior were
the same, when in fact nuclear costs were rising at least twice as fast. Examinalessons can

learn

—

—

tion of actual cost trends might have led utilities to curb nuclear expansion
earlier,

with savings of tens of billions of dollars. Instead, a pronuclear mind-set

blinded promoters to the warning signs, and nuclear power became a victim of

its

own propaganda.
Another lesson concerns the

failure of public or quasi-public institutions to

scrutinize the promoters' self-serving estimates

Congress or

its

watchdog agencies, not the

and underlying assumptions. Not

state utility regulators, not the credit-

rating agencies, not the think tanks or universities (with the exception of

Rand and Bupp's group

Mooz

at

Harvard) punctured the industry-government unanimity
on nuclear/coal costs until recently. To a disturbing extent, these groups merely
repackaged DOE or industry cost estimates, lending them a spurious aura of
scholarship. For example, the seemingly authoritative (and favorable to nuclear
power) economic evaluation in the 1977 "Nuclear Power Issues and Choices"
report by a group of academics convened by the Ford Foundation rested on industry and government engineering estimates; 34 the estimators later cited the
report as confirmation of their figures. Much of what appeared as a broad, independently won consensus on nuclear power's cost edge was created with mirrors.
The failure of coal interests to attack nuclear overoptimism is particularly
noteworthy, insofar as the two sectors compete for the same electricity market.
Unfortunately, overlap among coal and nuclear constructors and vendors, and
their common stance as champions of centralized electric generation and opat

ponents of environmental and safety regulation, militated against serious criticism. Indeed, the coal industry used nuclear promoters' exaggerated forecasts of
coal pollution control costs to lobby against stringent emission standards.
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forecasts.

final lesson, following
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on

Only

in 1978 did the coal industry begin distancing

economic and

from the
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first

two,
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the need for independent

consequences of major public investments.

The need

is

hardly confined to nuclear power (a parallel story to this could be

told about the utility industry's failings in forecasting electricity usage) or to

energy issues. The

momentum

generated in large undertakings

when they may be most needed

breeds intolerance of dissenting views, precisely

to correct the enterprise, or to determine whether

the unfortunate nuclear

too easily

all

it is

power experience helps to

worth pursuing

at all. If

institutionalize dissenting views

elsewhere, then perhaps the losses will have served a constructive purpose.
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